The probability of U.S. entering War against Iran is very low!
Mohibullah Noori, Head of Fajristan, Regional Activist Network, Washington
TECODH, June 21, 2025
Amid escalating military clashes between Iran and Israel and increasing threats from Trump regarding a potential military strike on Iran, concerns have arisen about whether the U.S. is on the brink of entering a new war in the Middle East? This analysis, relying on empirical evidence, legal data, and strategic trends, demonstrates that such a possibility is highly unlikely, and despite pressure from pro-Israel lobbies, the U.S. will not engage in direct war with Iran for several reasons.
First, the costly experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have fostered an anti-war culture in the U.S., making the American public deeply skeptical of future military adventurism.
Second, Trump, in his electoral campaigns, has repeatedly criticized “endless wars” and emphasized the need to focus on rebuilding the domestic economy. Entering a new war—especially against a country like Iran with unpredictable consequences—not only contradicts his campaign rhetoric but also risks Trump losing his supporters. His recent statements in June 2025, such as “Nobody knows what I will do” and “Next week will be very important,” are more indicative of a pressure strategy on Iran to join the negotiations than actual war preparations.
Third, under the U.S. Constitution, only Congress has the legal authority to declare war on other nations. The president, as commander-in-chief, can initiate military action only if Congress grants formal authorization or delegates to him limited temporary powers.
Fourth, U.S. intelligence agencies have emphasized in their reports that there is no evidence of Iran currently pursuing nuclear weapons. These assessments have been sufficient for the majority in Congress to rule out military action.
Fifth, the shift in U.S. strategy from the war on terror in the Middle East to geopolitical competition with China. One reason the U.S. will not go to war with Iran is the fundamental change in its strategic priorities over the past decade. Washington’s foreign policy has pivoted from counterterrorism in the Middle East to economic, technological, and military competition with China. In the U.S. national security strategy, the Indo-Pacific, is now considered the central arena of strategic competition, where China’s growing influence poses a more serious threat than Middle Eastern instability. Clear examples of this shift include:
.The Doha Agreement with the Taliban (2020), which led to the withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Afghanistan, marking the official end of large-scale U.S. military presence there.
.The reduced military presence in Syria, shifting focus from ground operations to deterrence and indirect crisis management. Trump’s direct engagement with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and his meeting with Al-Jolani, head of Syria’s interim government in the north (previously designated a terrorist group), reflect strategic realism in dealing with regional dynamics.
Sixth, the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between some Arab states and Israel, were part of U.S. efforts to reduce regional tensions and consolidate alliances to counter Chinese and Russian influence. This move aimed to free up the U.S. diplomatic resources for larger global competitions.
Thus, such developments indicate that the U.S. no longer seeks costly military engagements in the Middle East but prioritizes maintaining supremacy in major geopolitical rivalries, particularly with China. In this context, a full-scale war with Iran—without a direct and existential threat to the U.S. interests—would be unnecessary and contrary to the America’s broader national security strategy. The U.S. policymaking is transitioning from value-based interventionism (e.g., promoting democracy) to strategic pragmatism (e.g., cost management and threat containment without direct war).
Therefore, given widespread public opposition, congressional legal constraints, Trump’s electoral commitments, and the U.S. strategic pivot toward competing with China while focusing on economic interests, indicate that the U.S. is less likely to enter into a direct war with Iran.
Current U.S. threats and political maneuvers are primarily aimed at increasing pressure on Iran in negotiations rather than preparing for actual war. Without threats to U.S. national security, there will be no legal, intelligence-based, or moral justification for war in Congress.
TECODH (2003) is a private, nonprofit research firm dedicated to fostering innovation in interdisciplinary social sciences, publishes analytical articles and hosts academic workshops, and provides a platform for intellectual exchange. June 21, 2025.